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European treaties are notorious for legal ambiguities and internal contradictions resulting 
from precarious compromises between opposing views. The matter of the legal personality of 
the European Union is a good example of this and, given its potential importance, it is worthy 
of some attention. 
 
 
1. What the treaties say 
 
The  words  ‘European  Union’  began  to  circulate  widely  in  the  mid  seventies  when  the 
Belgian Prime Minister, Leo Tindemans, was tasked to draft a report on the concept.
1 He 
described  the  Union as a “new  phase  in  the  history  of  the  unification of  Europe” to  be 
achieved by a “qualitative change” resulting from strengthened institutions bringing together 
the various strands of intergovernmental cooperation and community matters. But it is only 
through the treaty of Maastricht, in 1992, that the concept was introduced in the European 
legal order. 
 
The ‘Treaty on European Union’
2 (the official title of the treaty of Maastricht) does indeed 
establish a European Union as a “new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union 
among the peoples of Europe” (article A, now article 1 TEU) and gives it as one of its 
objectives  “to  assert  its  identity  on  the  international  scene,  in  particular  through  the 
implementation of a common foreign and security policy” (article B, now article 2 TEU).  
 
Common sense suggests that in order to assert identity on the international scene one needs, 
first, to be recognised as an international legal entity. And to implement a common foreign 
policy,  one  obviously  needs  the  ability  to  act,  to  contact  and  to  contract  with  other 
international actors. Such was not the view that prevailed at Maastricht. Some considered 
that giving legal personality to the Union would compromise national sovereignty in foreign 
affairs. Others considered that it might impinge on the legal personality of the Community. 
                                                
*  Philippe  de  Schoutheete  is  Director  of  European  Studies  at  Egmont —  Royal  Institute  for  International 
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1 See the ‘European Union’ Report by Mr.  Leo  TINDEMANS, Prime Minister  of Belgium, to the European 
Council. Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 1/76, p. 12. 
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Together they agreed, with little debate, that the Union would not have legal personality and 
that position, however contradictory, was not disputed.
3 
 
In the negotiations that were to lead to the treaty of Amsterdam, the inherent contradiction in 
the position taken at Maastricht was widely recognised. The report of the Reflection Group 
preparing the intergovernmental conference stated that “the fact that the Union does not exist 
is a source of confusion outside and diminishes its external role”. The European Parliament 
and the Irish and Dutch presidencies suggested that the Union should have legal personality, 
preferably  absorbing  the  legal  personalities  of  the  three  existing  Communities.
4  Those 
proposals found majority support but they failed in front of determined British and French 
opposition.  
 
However the same treaty deepened the paradox by giving the Union a form of treaty-making 
power. It introduced what are now articles 24 and 38 TEU which allow agreements to be 
concluded in the field of common foreign and security policy (title V) and in the field of 
police and judicial cooperation (title VI). Those agreements are negotiated by the Presidency 
and  concluded  by  the  Council.  The  Council  is  an  institution  of  the  Union,  not  an 
intergovernmental conference, and it is therefore the Union, not a conglomeration of member 
states, which is bound by those agreements. Even if article 24 TEU foresees the possibility 
for a member state to request a national ratification procedure in exceptional cases,
5 and even 
if Declaration 4 annexed to the treaty specifies (unnecessarily) that the same article does not 
imply a transfer of competence, the fact remains that member states, while refusing formally 
to recognise the legal personality of the Union, were giving it a form of treaty-making power 
which is one of the main characteristics of international legal personality.
6 
 
The  treaty  of  Nice,  which  some  have  called  “the  culmination  of  confusion”
7,  made  the 
implicit ambiguity even more apparent by adding two modalities to article 24. Paragraph 3 
indicates  that,  in  given  circumstances,  an  agreement  can  be  approved  in  Council  by  a 
qualified majority. Paragraph 6 states the obvious in saying that agreements concluded bind 
the institutions of the Union. Both paragraphs cannot be explained without implying the 
existence  of  a  legal  entity  having  the  capacity  to  conclude  agreements  which  bind  the 
institutions and, in some cases, even the member states who voted against it.  
 
Such was the situation when the European Convention met in Brussels in the spring of 2002. 
One of its first decisions was to create a working group on legal personality, chaired by 
Giuliano Amato, which delivered its final report
8 on 1 October . Its main conclusion was 
“that there was a very broad consensus (with one member against) that the Union should in 
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III “Legal personality”, Working Document III, Meeting of 26 June 2002.  
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future have its own explicit legal personality. It should be a single legal personality and 
should replace the existing personalities”. It stated that giving the Union a legal personality 
additional to those that now exist would not go far enough in providing the clarification and 
simplification necessary in the Union's external relations. It underlined that explicit conferral 
of a single legal personality on the Union does not per se entail any amendment, either to the 
current  allocation  of  competences  between  the  Union  and  the  Member  States  or  to  the 
allocation of competences between the current Union and Community. 
 
This important report had far reaching consequences, including on the ‘pillar’ structure of the 
treaties, and therefore on the general structure of the Constitutional treaty.
9 Its conclusions 
were ratified by the Convention and translated into article 6 of the draft treaty transmitted to 
the  European  Council  in  July  2003:  “The  Union  shall  have  legal  personality”.
10  In  due 
course that short text became article I-7 of the treaty signed in Rome on 29 October 2004. It 
is completed by article IV-438 which says “The European Union established by this Treaty 
shall be the successor to the European Union established by the Treaty on European Union 
and to the European Community”. This combination “ended the separate legal personality of 
the  European  Community:  from  now  on  there  would  be  only  one  legally  recognised 
organisation (the “European Union”) with a single legal personality”.
11 
 
This would indeed put an end to the long story of ambiguity and internal contradiction which 
we have described above. But, as we all know, that treaty has not entered into force and is 
not likely to do so in its present form. Until that constitutional dilemma is solved, we remain 
therefore in the previous uncertain situation. 
 
 
2. What International Law says
12 
 
The easiest way for an international organisation to acquire international legal personality is 
to include a specific mention to that effect in its constitutional charter. This was done for the 
three treaties establishing the European Communities in the 50s.
13 As we have seen above, 
the Maastricht and following treaties refrained from doing this in the case of the European 
Union. 
 
However it has long been accepted in international public law that legal personality can also 
be implicitly conferred to an international organisation. The traditional basis for this is an 
advisory opinion concerning the United Nations delivered more than fifty years ago by the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ).
14 After having analysed the UN Charter and subsequent 
treaties, the practice of the organisation and its duties and obligations, the Court concluded 
that the members of the UN “by entrusting certain functions to it, with the attendant duties 
                                                
9 See G.AMATO, H. BRIBOSIA and B. DE WITTE, Genesis and Destiny of the European Constitution, Bruylant. 
Bruxelles, 2007, p. 202-204. 
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l'Union européenne : Le débat qui n'existait pas, in Ch. FRANCK & G. DUCHENNE (dir.), L'action extérieure de 
l'Union européenne, Actes de la XIe Chaire Glaverbel d'études européennes (2005-2006) (Louvain-la-Neuve, 
Academia-Bruylant, 2007), on which this contribution draws extensively. 
13 Cf. art.205 (1) EC Treaty; art.6 first para. ECSC Treaty; and art.184 Euratom Treaty. 
14 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, International Court of Justice, Advisory 
Opinion of 11 April 1949, ICJ Reports (1949).  
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and responsibilities, have clothed it with the competence required to enable those functions 
to be effectively discharged”.  
 
The question arising, therefore, is whether the reasoning held by the ICJ in 1949 concerning 
the UN can and should be extended today to the European Union. In the opinion of the Court, 
the rights and duties of an international entity such as the Union depend on its “purposes and 
functions as specified or implied in its constituent documents and developed in practice”. We 
have analysed above the purposes and functions of the Union in the international sphere, and 
we will examine the practice subsequently. 
 
There is little doubt that in tasking the Union “to assert its identity on the international scene, 
in  particular  through  the  implementation  of  a  common  foreign  and  security  policy”  the 
signatories  of  the  Maastricht  treaty  gave  it  a  purpose  which  implied  international  legal 
personality. What identity could it assert if it had no personality? Similarly when allowing 
the Council of the Union to conclude agreements in the field of common foreign and security 
policy (title V) and in the field of police and judicial cooperation (title VI) the signatories of 
the  Amsterdam  treaty  confirmed  that  the  Union  had  a  form  of  treaty-making  power,  a 
function which implies international legal personality. The first condition posed by the Court 
(purposes and functions) seems therefore to be clearly satisfied in the case of the Union. 
 
The position taken by the Court in 1949 is not disputed. Brownlie,
15 analysing that opinion, 
describes three criteria which determine the existence of international legal personality: 
• a permanent association of States equipped with organs: which the Union undoubtedly is; 
• a  distinction  in  terms  of  legal  powers  and  purposes  between  the  organisation  and  its 
member states: asserting the identity of the Union on the international scene is a purpose 
which is clearly distinct from that of the member states; 
• the existence of legal powers exercisable on the international plane: articles 24 and 38 TEU 
provide such legal powers. 
 
Similarly Dailler and Pellet
16 indicate that an organisation has international legal personality 
as soon as it is tasked with some “missions qui impliquent une capacité d’action autonome 
dans les relations internationales”. It would be difficult to argue that a common foreign and 
security policy can be implemented without a capacity for autonomous action. 
 
After clarifying the principles we should analyse the practice. 
 
But  before  examining  the  practice  of  the  European  Union  in  the  field  of  international 
relations it is worth underlining the limits which international public law sets on the legal 
personality of international organisations. An important point is underlined by the advisory 
opinion of the ICJ quoted above when it makes the distinction between States who “possess 
the  totality  of  international  rights  and  duties  recognised  by  international  law”  and 
Organisations whose rights and duties depend on their purpose and function. The point can 
be formulated in another way by saying that by acquiring international legal personality an 
organisation acquires the capacity to act in the international sphere, but it does not acquire 
the  competence  to  do  so.  That  competence  depends  on  its  constituent  texts  and  varies 
therefore from one organisation to another. When Declaration 4 annexed to the treaty of 
                                                
15 I. BROWNLIE, Principles of Public International Law, 6
th edition (Oxford University Press, 2003), p.649 
16 P. DAILLER and A. PELLET, Droit International Public, 7
th edition (Paris, L.G.D.J., 2002), p. 596.  
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Amsterdam
17  says  that  articles  24  and  38  TEU  (which  give  the  Union  the  capacity  to 
conclude agreements) does not imply a transfer of competence, it states the obvious, applying 
a general rule of international law, and is therefore redundant, like so many other declarations 
attached to European treaties.  
 
Similarly the existence of international legal personality has no relation, positive or negative, 
to the intergovernmental or the supranational character of the organisation concerned. Many 
intergovernmental  organisations  of  the  UN  family  (UNESCO,  WHO,  FAO,  etc.)  have 
international legal personality, as do the World Bank and the IMF. The Universal Postal 
Union  has  it  also;
18  it  was  founded  in  1874  at  a  time  when  the  concept  and  the  word 
‘supranational’ would have been meaningless. 
 
 
3. Legal Personality of the EU in Practice 
 
The  purpose,  and  importance,  of  international  legal  personality  is  to  enable an  entity  to 
communicate  and  operate  with  other  international  actors  on  an  equal  basis.  Practice  is 
therefore important. It is difficult, and would be rather absurd, to deny international legal 
personality to an entity which is recognised by other international actors as having it. Practice 
translates into two specific characteristics: the capacity to contract agreements with other 
international actors (treaty-making power) and the capacity to entertain bilateral diplomatic 
relations with those international actors (active and passive right of legation). Those two 
criteria can be taken into consideration in order to assess the level of international recognition 
of the European Union as a legal personality. 
 
Treaty-Making Power 
 
Crisis management in the Balkans and elsewhere has been a privileged field of activity for 
the treaty-making power attributed to the Union by article 24 TUE. These agreements have 
been concluded either with countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Indonesia 
or the Democratic Republic of Congo where the Union was operating, or with third countries, 
such  as  Switzerland,  Chile,  Morocco  or  New  Zealand,  participating  in  peacekeeping 
operations led by the Union. More than sixty such agreements have been concluded. 
 
We can take as an example the agreement concluded on 4 October 2002 on the activities of 
the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
19 Its signature had been 
approved on 30
th September 2002 by a Council decision based on article 24 TEU. The parties 
are the European Union and Bosnia and Herzegovina “together hereinafter referred to as the 
Participating Parties”. Article 4 specifies that “EUPM shall be granted the status equivalent 
to that of a diplomatic mission” and that “EUPM personnel shall be granted all privileges 
and immunities equivalent to that of diplomatic agents granted under the Vienna Convention 
on  Diplomatic  Relations  of  18  April  1961”.  Similar  clauses  concern  technical  and 
administrative staff and locally hired auxiliary personnel. Article 6 indicates that the EUPM 
                                                
17  Declaration  No.  4  annexed  to  the  Final  Act  of  the  Amsterdam  Treaty,  which  reads  as  follows:  “The 
provisions of Articles J.14 and K.10 of the Treaty on European Union and any agreement resulting from them 
shall not imply any transfer of competence from the Member State to the European Union” (these articles were 
subsequently renumbered articles 24 and 38 TUE).  
18 This has been recognised by judgments of the administrative court of the ILO. See for instance Case Zayed 
(Nos 4 and 5) Judgement No 1013 of the administrative court of the ILO. See http://www.ilo.org. 
19 OJ L 293/2 of 29 October 2002. The Council decision approving the agreement bears number L 293/1.  
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may  display  the  flag  of  the  European  Union  on  its  main  headquarters  in  Sarajevo,  and 
otherwise as decided by the Head of Mission. It seems difficult to deny that Bosnia and 
Herzegovina recognizes the European Union as an international actor with legal personality. 
 
We can also look at the agreement concluded on 25 July 2005 on the participation of the 
Republic of Chile in the European Union military crisis management operation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.
20  It  is  concluded  between  the  European  Union  and  the  Republic  of  Chile 
“hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  Parties”.  Chile  associates  itself  with  Joint  Action 
2004/570/CFSP of 12 July 2004
21 on the European Union military operation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and shall ensure that its forces and personnel participating in the EU operation 
undertake their mission in conformity with that Joint Action. Any necessary technical and 
administrative  implementation  arrangement  shall  be  concluded  between  the  Secretary-
General of the Council of the European Union and the appropriate authorities of the Republic 
of Chile. Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the agreement “shall be 
settled by diplomatic means between the Parties”. 
 
In the agreement concluded on 1 September 2005 with the Democratic Republic of Congo on 
the status and activities of the European Union police mission
22 (EUPOL Kinshasa) we find 
similar clauses on diplomatic immunity, diplomatic status for the agents, flying the EU flag 
on headquarters and solving disputes between parties by diplomatic means. 
 
Many more examples can be found in the Official Journal of the European Union. 
 
The fact is that EU practice makes generous use of the treaty-making power granted by 
article 24 TEU and that all sorts of countries across the world accept its capacity to conclude 
such agreements. This is also the case for international organisations such as the International 
Penal Court
23, NATO
24 or the ACP countries, which have concluded agreements with the 
European Union. 
 
Agreements have also been concluded on the basis of article 38 TEU, e.g. with Iceland and 
Norway  on  the  application  of  certain  provisions  of  the  Convention  of  29  May  2000  on 
mutual assistance in criminal matters.
25 Other agreements are based both on articles 24 and 
38, e.g. an agreement with the United States on extradition and mutual legal assistance in 
criminal matters
26 in which article 2.1 specifies that “ ‘Contracting Parties’ shall mean the 
European Union and the United States of America”. Here again there is no doubt that the 
European Union is recognised as a ‘party’, i.e. an international actor with treaty making 
power. But in the delicate field of title VI, the elements of ambiguity and legal uncertainty 
present in the treaties, e.g. the possibility offered by article 24 TEU for member states to 
request national ratification procedures, have cast some doubt on the full capacity of the 
Union and led to requests for more direct implication of the member states.  
 
The Right of Mission 
 
                                                
20 OJ L 202/40 of 8 August 2005. The Council decision approving the agreement bears number L 202/39. 
21 OJ L 252/10 of 28 July 2004. 
22 OJ L 256/62 of 1 October 2005. 
23 OJ L 115 of 28 April 2006. 
24 OJ L 80 of 27 March 2003. 
25 OJ L 26/3 of 29 January 2004. 
26 OJ L 181/25 of 19 July 2003.  
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The European Community has entertained for a considerable number of years a network of 
representations staffed by the Commission. They enjoy diplomatic status and are normally 
led by an official with the rank and courtesy title of ambassador. There are more than a 
hundred of these and they cover most of the world. The Council has two representations 
accredited to the UN in New York and Geneva. Reciprocally one of the biggest diplomatic 
corps in the world is accredited to the European institutions in Brussels, representing all sizes 
of countries, from Andorra to China. 
 
In practice this active and passive diplomatic network serves both for Community matters 
and  European  Union  activities  such  as  the  common  foreign  and  security  policy.  The 
Commission website indicates that Delegations play an increasing role in the conduct of the 
Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy  (CFSP),  providing  regular  political  analysis, 
contributing  to  the  policy-making  process,  providing  support  and  assistance  to  the  other 
institutions and actors of the EU, including the High Representative for CFSP, who can rely 
on their logistical support when on mission and to whom all their policy reports are copied.
27 
 
The ‘diplomatic means’, to which we have seen that many agreements concluded by the 
Union refer for the settlement of disputes, are to a large extent to be found in that network. 
Not exclusively however because a parallel network of “special representatives” has also 
been developed. 
 
The treaty of Amsterdam created a High Representative for CFSP who is also Secretary 
General of the Council. The first High Representative, Javier Solana, has developed a high 
political profile and created an important  diplomatic tool.  He has personally  participated 
actively in a great number of diplomatic activities, attempting to resolve crises, taking the 
floor in the UN Security Council, representing the Union in the Quartet which has been 
trying  to  solve  the  Israeli-Arab  conflict.  One  of  the  instruments  at  his  disposal  is  the 
appointment of ‘special representatives’ of the Union in specific regions, most frequently in 
cases of crisis: Middle East, Great Lakes, Macedonia, Kosovo, Moldova, Afghanistan, South 
Caucasus, etc. In practice these representatives make use of the infrastructure of the local EC 
representations and, by all accounts, relations are correct and fruitful, even when tension 
prevails in Brussels between Commission and Council services.
28 In many cases ‘special 
representatives’ have been highly influential and well respected, but stricto sensu they do not 
automatically have diplomatic status. Local authorities have been known to underline the 
point by depriving them of perks such as special number plates for their cars. Nevertheless 
they are quite numerous, well accepted and efficient. Together with the EC representations, 
they constitute, in a pragmatic way, a quasi-diplomatic service of the Union. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
There is little doubt that the European Union has implicitly acquired an international legal 
personality. It fulfils the conditions set by international law, in particular the International 
Court of Justice, for the recognition of this status. And international practice has confirmed 
it: a large number of states have concluded, in recent years, international agreements with the 
Union  and  accepted  its  representatives.  In  1996,  the  Reflection  Group  preparing  the 
                                                
27 http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/delegations/intro/role.htm 
28 In Macedonia the special representative is simultaneously head of the EC delegation.  
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Amsterdam negotiations said that the Union “did not exist” on the international scene. That 
would no longer be true today. The Union is a recognised actor in its own right. 
 
Nevertheless the ambiguities of the treaty texts, combined with the fact that member states 
had not, before the Constitutional treaty, been able to agree on formal recognition of that 
personality, can create a potential element of legal uncertainty. This can lead, at times, to 
sincere doubts about the capacity of the Union to bind its member states, as has been the case 
in some negotiations on matters of police and justice. It can also be used by our negotiating 
partners in order to gain a tactical advantage by casting doubt on the legal status of the 
Union.
29 In both cases it is detrimental to our interests. 
 
The working group chaired by Giuliano Amato during the Convention proposed by far the 
best  solution,  namely  the formal  recognition  of  the  international legal personality  of  the 
Union and the absorption by the Union of the legal personality of the European Community. 
This translated into articles I-7 and IV-438 of the Constitutional Treaty. It is very much to be 
hoped that those clauses will survive in whatever institutional solution is elaborated to solve 
the present constitutional impasse. 
 
If we accept, as we think we all must, that the European Union has, today, an implicit legal 
personality when acting in fields of its competence, formal recognition of that fact should not 
prove impossible to achieve. We would not be creating a new legal situation, but simply 
recognising an existing one.  
 
It might seem utopian to suggest such a course given past opposition of some countries, 
notably Britain, to the European Union’s legal personality. But the last official debate on the 
matter took place in the Convention in 2002 and many things have changed since then. As 
indicated  above  the  Union  has,  in  the  last  few  years,  concluded  dozens  of  international 
agreements  and  sent  special  representatives  to  many  parts  of  the  world.  It  is  no  longer 
realistic  to  deny  that  the  Union  has  in  fact  become  an  international  actor.  Pragmatism 
imposes recognition of that fact. 
 
Misgivings could well be diminished if three points mentioned above were made sufficiently 
clear: 
•  international legal personality is not the first step towards the emergence of a super-state: 
the UN has had it for over half a century and nobody in his right mind has ever suggested 
it was becoming a super-state; 
•  international legal personality has no influence on the competence of the organisation 
which  acquires  it:  the  competence  of  an  organisation  results  from  its  constituent 
documents, irrespective of the existence or otherwise of legal personality; 
•  international legal personality has no relation to the intergovernmental or supranational 
character of the organisation which acquires it: several intergovernmental organisations 
have it and others do not. 
 
It could well be argued that a treaty text recognising legal personality and simultaneously 
reasserting  some  of  these  points  would  give  more  guarantees  to  those  who  fear  the 
                                                
29 Questioning the legal status of your interlocutor in order to gain tactical advantage and, if possible, extract 
concessions is a classic diplomatic ploy, fully mastered by Talleyrand, notably in his dealings with the smaller 
German princes. More recently the Soviet Union used it, or at least attempted to use it, for many years in its 
relations with the nascent European Community.  
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consequences of this step than simply letting the future be fashioned by implicit and informal 
developments. By nature these are difficult to control. 
 
The absence of a treaty clause would of course in no way diminish the existing implicit legal 
personality of the Union, now recognised worldwide and disputed only by a small minority 
of member states. The situation would develop as it has done in the past few years with 
additional  evidence  in  the  form  of  new  treaties  concluded  with  more  partners.  But  the 
situation would be much less satisfactory than that resulting from the constitutional treaty. As 
the  Convention  working  group  indicated,  “it  would  not  go  far  enough  in  providing  the 
clarification  and  simplification  necessary  in  the  Union's  external  relations”.  Some 
ambiguities would remain and the coexistence of two legal personalities, the European Union 
and the European Community, would be an embarrassment, contradicting the fundamental 
unity of purpose which, ever since Maastricht, we have been trying to give to the different 
branches of the European process.  
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